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Victims, Truth, and Detention--The People
Spoke
James R. Adams*
"The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or
determine right." Alexander Hamilton'
JNTRODUCTON
Ten years ago, under the guise of creating rights for victims of
crime, several groups cooperated in the creation, promotion, and
passage of the so-called "Victims' Bill of Rights." 2 Surprisingly,
this initiative was largely concerned with bringing about changes
in the state's criminal justice system. In the eyes of the drafters
* Professor, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; B.S., University of Iowa,
1948; J.D., University of Iowa School of Law, 1951. I thank my research assistant, Nannette
Stomberg (J.D. candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 1992) for her valuable
assistance.
1. RECORDS OF THE FEDmAL CONVENnON, vol. 1, at 299 (Farrand ed. 1966).
2. Victims' Bill of Rights, Initiative Measure Proposition 8 (approved June 8,1982) (codified
at CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 28; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25, 667, 1191.1, 1192.7, 3043 (West Supp.
1992); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1732.5, 1767, 6331 (West Supp. 1992)). See Brosnahan v.
Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236,300-06,651 P.2d 274,314-20, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30,70-76 (1982) (setting forth
the ballot pamphlet containing Proposition 8's text and the arguments and analysis of the initiative).
3. The essential elements of Proposition 8 included the rights of restitution, safe schools, and
the right to be involved in the sentencing process. See Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 242-45, 651 P.2d
at 277-79, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 33-35 (summarizing the provisions of Proposition 8). These "rights"
relate directly to victims. In addition, Proposition 8 called for the abrogation of most exclusionary
rules, restrictions on the right to bail, the unlimited use of convictions for impeachment and for
enhancement purposes, abolition of the diminished capacity defense, tougher sentences for habitual
criminals, limitations on plea bargaining, and restrictions on commitment to the California Youth
Authority. Id These changes relate solely to procedures affecting those accused or convicted of
crime. Even so, the Supreme Court of California found all these issues were "reasonably germane"
to the concern for crime victims. Il at 247, 651 P.2d at 280, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 23
and supporters of the initiative, procedural changes were necessary
to promote the life, liberty and happiness of victims of crime.4
This populist approach to justice was not new, but when basic
changes are urged through initiative, such efforts must be
watched. These are times of televised voter education. A
professionally prepared thirty-second TV "bit" featuring a well-
known actor easily replaces thought. Those voting for or against
Proposition 8 did not have to read the proposal or understand its
significance; they could rely on the costly commercials. After all,
who doesn't sympathize with victims, and who wants to hide the
truth? Nobody. We must get those crooks off the streets and keep
4. Such changes in the rules of evidence and procedure were to satisfy "'the more basic
expectations that persons who commit felonious acts ... will be appropriately detained,... tried,
... and punished .... " CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(a) (enacted by Proposition 8).
5.' Proposition 8 is an outstanding example of the limitations and risks involved in the use
of the initiative process. The process is needed when a substantial number of the public believe the
legislature has failed to identify and resolve a pressing social problem. However, each initiative must
be strictly confined to one subject so that the voters can be fully informed on the precise problem
and the proponent's proffered solution. The risk of multiple subjects is clear;, a voter may be firmly
in favor of one or more but not all. Such a voter may vote for something he or she is not really in
favor of or is simply indifferent to. Worst of all, the side issues may be unnoticed by many.
Under normal circumstances, people rely on the legislature to remedy social, economic or
political problems. The legislature is, in theory, a more deliberate body made up of persons chosen
to serve us all. Unfortunately, legislative solutions are often no more acceptable than court decisions
or initiatives such as Proposition 8. For instance, in response to widely publicized and alarming
reports of increasing child sexual abuse, many states enacted laws easing the prosecution's proof
problems in such cases. See, e.g., ARiZ. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (1989); CAL EVD. CODE §
1228(a) (West Supp. 1992). A higher conviction rate is the obvious objective of such legislation.
Physical evidence is often lacking and the only real witness may be a child who is the alleged victim.
But do relaxations of long standing evidence rules get us closer to the truth? Don't some of these
interfere with an accused's right to confront the witnesses against him or her? See White v. Illinois,
112 S. CL 736 (1992); Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. CL 3157 (1990); Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139
(1990) (indicating the nature of the resulting problems). What of due process when the trial judge
lets a child witness testify by closed circuit television; isn't the judge telling the jury she has found
the child isjustifiably terrified by the defendant? What of the so-called "'rape shield" laws? See, e.g.,
CAL. Evw. CODE §§ 782, 1103(c)(1) (West Supp. 1992); FED. R. Evm. 412. Are they just specific
examples of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 or California Evidence Code section 3527
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them in jail. The Proposition 8 campaign told voters that restricting
bail and lowering evidence barriers were steps in that direction.6
However, feelings of outrage persist. The more recent victory
of Proposition 115, the so-called "Crime Victims' Justice Reform
Act" cannot be ignored.7 Proposition 115 has been ruled
constitutional despite the claim that it encompassed more than one
subject and improperly revised the Constitution.! It was
Proposition 115 that opened the two-way street of reciprocal
discovery in California.' Again, a majority of the voting electorate
has given additional tools to the prosecution in a continued effort
to scale the court-made wall which protects accused persons in this
democracy.
Does such majority made law lead us to a better quality of
justice? Proposition 115's discovery provision goes farther than
federal law, which only allows discovery of alibi witnesses."0
While the proponents proclaim these are great days for justice in
California, it is fair to ask why the accused must help the
prosecution; it is not his or her job to do so. It is well established
that the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; the
accused need do nothing of a testimonial nature. This is a right
6. See Deukmejian, Arguments in Favor of Proposition 8, in CAL. BALLOT PAMPRLET 34
(June 8, 1982) (stating "THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO QUESTION THAT THE PASSAGE OF
THIIS PROPOSITION WILL RESULT IN MORE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS, MORE
CRIMINALS BEING SENTENCED TO STATE PRISON, AND MORE PROTECTION FOR THE
LAW-ABIDING CITIZENRY") (emphasis in original).
7. Crime victims Justice Reform Act, Initiative Measure Prop. 115 (approved June 5, 1990)
(codified at CAL CONST. art. I, §§ 14.1, 24,29, 30; CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 223,223.5 (West Supp.
1992); CAL. EViD. CODE § 1203.1 (West Supp. 1992); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189, 190.2, 190.41,
190.5,206,206.1,859,866,871.6,872,954.1,987.05,1049.5,1050.1, 1054,1054.1, 1054.2,1054.3,
1054.4, 1054.5, 1054.6, 1054.7, 1102-5, 1102.7, 1385.1, 1430, 1511 (West Supp. 1992)).
8. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990).
9. CAL CONST. art. I, § 30(c) (enacted by Proposition 115). See Izazaga v. Superior Court,
54 Cal. 3d 356,363,815 P.2d 304,308,285 Cal. Rptr. 231,235 (1991) ("Proposition 115 effectively
reopened the two-way street of reciprocal discovery in criminal cases in California").
10. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(a) (requiring a defendant to disclose the names and addresses
of alibi witnesses). See also i& 16(b)(2) (stating the general rule that the names of defense witnesses
are not subject to disclosure).
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recognized in the Bill of Rights and California's Constitution."
In fact, the California Supreme Court (under Chief Justice Rose
Bird) struck down a reciprocal discovery statute enacted by the
legislature.1
2
No one doubts that victims of crime13 suffer tremendously.
Their lot deserves full attention. However, many people feel that
society pays more attention to the perpetrators of crime than to the
victims of crime. 14 In fact, it wasn't until 1965 that California
became the first state to provide a victims' compensation plan.'"
Progress has been slow.
The problems perceived by the proponents and supporters of
Proposition 8 are described in the initiative itself.16 The now
11. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V; CAI. CONST. art I, § 15.
12. See In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543, 558, 698 P.2d 637, 648, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569, 580
(1985) (finding that a statute which allowed the prosecutor to discover prior statements of defense
witnesses other than the defendant was a violation of the California Constitution's provision granting
the criminal defendant the privilege against self-incrimination). Misener has been overruled by
Proposition 115. See Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 815 P.2d 304, 285 Cal. Rptr. 231
(1991).
13. We must include as "victims of crime" those witnesses who are involuntarily involved
in the prosecution or defense of the accused.
14. See, e.g., PREsIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMs OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT (1982) at v
(statement of Lois Haight Herrington, Chairman).
15. See Letters ofIntroduction, 11 PEPPERDiNE L. REv. xiii (Governor Deulanejian's letter).
By the time Proposition 8 became law in California, thirty-six other states had crime victim
compensation plans in place. Id. See also infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text (discussing
California's victim compensation system).
16. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(a) (enacted by Proposition 8). Section 28(a) provides:
The People of the State of California find and declare that the enactment of
comprehensive provisions and laws ensuring a bill of rights for victims of crime, including
safeguards in the criminal justice system to fully protect those rights, is a matter of grave
statewide concern.
The rights of victims pervade the criminal justice system, encompassing not only the
right to restitution from the wrongdoers for financial losses suffered as a result of criminal
acts, but also the more basic expectations that persons who commit felonious acts causing
injury to innocent victims will be appropriately detained in custody, tried by the courts,
and sufficiently punished that the public safety is protected and encouraged as a goal of
highest importance.
Such public safety extends to public primary, elementary, junior high, and senior
high school campuses, where students and staff have the right to be safe and secure in
their persons.
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apparent consequences of particular portions of the enactment are
described by several of the articles that make up this Symposium.
This Article will review some of the problems targeted by the
drafters of the initiative that led to the conception and eventual
birth of Proposition 8 and the relationship these problems have to
the California criminal justice system.17 I will then discuss the
relevance and significance of the proponents' answers to those
problems." The conclusion could be stated in the form of a
question; has Don Quixote struck again? 9 The answer must be
I 'Yes ')
I. PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
It was not just the emotional and economic frustrations of
victims and witnesses that motivated the proponents of Proposition
8. It was also the seemingly endless march of the California courts
to the "left" 2 ° that compelled counteraction by the Victims'
To accomplish these goals, broad reforms in the procedural treatment of accused
persons and the disposition and sentencing of convicted persons are necessary and proper
as deterrents to criminal behavior and to serious disruption of people's lives.
ICE
17. See infra notes 20-39 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 40-142 and accompanying text.
19. CERVANTES, THE HISTORY OF DON QUIXOTE DE LA MANCHA (1952). Like Don Quixote,
the authors of Proposition 8 have cloaked themselves in the armor of "law and order" and set out
to perform heroic deeds for victims of crime. Also like Don Quixote, they have made giants out of
windmills such as the Evidence Code provisions limiting the use of character evidence and prior
convictions injury trials. Unlike Don Quixote, the drafters of Proposition 8 are real people, limiting
the rights of the accused in ways that ultimately limit the rights of all citizens of California. See infra
notes 143-153 and accompanying text.
20. By "left" I mean in favor of the accused. Until recently, the California Supreme Court
provided greater protection to those accused of crime than did the United States Supreme Court.
Compare People v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595, 606, 580 P.2d 672, 678, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172, 178 (1978)
(stating that the California Constitution requires the state to show beyond a reasonable doubt that a
confession was voluntary) with Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 487-89 (1972) (federal constitution
requires only a preponderance standard of proof). See People v. Markham, 49 Cal. 3d 63, 64-65, 775
P.2d 1042, 1043, 260 Cal. Rptr. 273, 274 (1989) (announcing the post-Proposition 8 rule in
California as requiring no greater degree of proof of voluntariness than the federal preponderance
standard).
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Rights coalition. The majority of Californians who voted in 1982
agreed that changes were necessary.2' They were convinced that
the courts were keeping the truth from juries in an effort to protect
the accused, that bail was too easily obtained, and that plea
bargaining was working against the interests of the public.22
Californians also apparently believed that victims should play a
more active role in the criminal justice process.'
Aside from demanding more considerate treatment of victims
and witnesses and some improvement in restitution rights,
Proposition 8's proponents apparently intended to abolish the
California version of the so-called "exclusionary rule. ' 24
California courts can no longer interpret the California Constitution
to allow the exclusion of evidence that would be admissible under
the federal constitution.' It was also the voting majority's
perception that failure to inform jurors of the fact that the
defendant "had a record," was improper; after all, would an honest
21. 56.4% of the voters voted in favor of Proposition 8, and 43.6% were opposed. Jost,
Victims of Proposition 8, LA. Daily J., June 12, 1982, at 3, col. 5-6.
22. Curb, Arguments in Favor of Proposition 8, in CAL BALLOT PAMHLEr, supra note 6,
at 32.
23. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (enacted by Proposition 8) (providing for victim
statements).
24. For example, prior to Proposition 8, California did not recognize an impeachment
exception to the Miranda rule. See People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 113,545 P.2d 272,280, 127
Cal. Rptr. 360,368 (1976). In 1985, the Supreme Court of California held that article I, section 28(d)
(enacted by Proposition 8) abrogates the authority of California's courts to develop broader remedies
on search issues than those provided under federal law. In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 886-88, 694
P.2d 744, 752-54, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 639-40 (1985). In 1988 the Supreme Court of California
applied this rationale to overrule People v. Disbrow. People v. May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 318-20, 748
P.2d 307,312-13,243 Cal. Rptr. 369, 374-75 (1988) (extending section 28(d) to issues of compulsory
self-incrimination).
25. See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d at 886-88, 694 P.2d at 752-54, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40
(holding that after Proposition 8, California courts can no longer develop broader remedies on search
issues than those provided under federal law). See also Legislative Analyst of California, Analysis,
in C L. BALLOT P mm.TEr, supra note 6, at 32 (stating that "'[u]nder current law, certain evidence
is not permitted to be presented in a criminal trial or hearing .... This measure generally would
allow most relevant evidence to be presented in criminal cases ... [but] [t]he measure could not
affect federal restrictions on the use of evidence") (emphasis in original).
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person commit a felony?26 Finally, pre-trial detention seemed like
a good idea to many; why let crooks commit more felonies after
they were arrested?27
To accomplish these goals, Proposition 8 amended the
California Constitution by attempting to delete section 12 of Article
18 and adding section 28 to that article. The constitutional
changes included restitution for those who suffer "losses" as a
result of criminal activity 9 and an assurance of safe schools for
public school students and staff.3" The California constitution was
also made to proclaim that judges cannot exclude relevant evidence
in criminal or juvenile proceedings.3 In addition, section 28 of
article I permits unlimited use of any felony conviction for
impeachment purposes in a criminal proceeding and for
26. See Legislative Analyst of California, Analysis, in CAL. BALLOT PAMPHL.T, supra note
6, at 54 (stating that the proposition would change current law to allow prior felony convictions to
be used "without limitation to discredit the testimony of a witness, including that of a defendant").
27. Curb, Arguments in Favor of Proposition 8, in CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLt, supra note 6,
at 34 (arguing that a "yes" vote on Proposition 8 would give "us" a "tool to stop extremely
dangerous offenders from being released on bail to commit more violent crimes").
28. Section 12 reads as follows: "A person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties,
except for:. (a) capital crimes when the facts are evident or the presumption great; ... Excessive bail
may not be required .... A person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the court's
discretion." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12. Proposition 8 did not repeal section 12 because Assembly
Constitutional Amendment No. 14 (1982) received a higher number of votes at the primary election
held June 8, 1982.
29. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b) (enacted by Proposition 8).
30. See iU. § 28(c) (enacted by Proposition 8). Under this provision, students and staff have
an "inalienable right" to safe, secure and peaceful campuses. lM.
31. Id. § 28(d) (enacted by Proposition 8). However, this lowering of existing and codified
barriers to proof does not to apply to California Evidence Code provisions describing privileges,
governing hearsay, or to Evidence Code section 352 (the so-called "legal relevancy" provision),
section 782 (limiting impeachment by prior sexual conduct of victim), and section 1103
(circumventing substantive use of priorsexual conduct of victim). CAL. CONST. art I, § 28(d) (enacted
by Proposition 8). Finally, rules protecting freedom of the press remained untouched. Ida
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32enhancement of sentences. So much for the constitutional
changes.33
Proposition 8 also amended the California Penal Code so as to
abolish the defense of diminished capacity34 and to place the
burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence on any
defendant claiming insanity as a defense. 5 Additionally, anyone
convicted of a "serious felony" must receive an enhanced sentence
for each prior conviction; these enhanced sentences are to run
consecutively.36
Great public interest existed in the provisions of Proposition 8
allowing victims to express their views concerning both the crime
and the criminal at sentencing and parol proceedings.37
Additionally, lawyers active in the criminal practice must have
been quite interested in the proposition's renewal of the effort to
outlaw plea bargaining. According to Proposition 8, such "dealing
32. Id § 28(f) (enacted by Proposition 8). When a prior conviction is an clement of the
charged felony, evidence of such a conviction must be presented in open court. Id See infra notes
105-114 and accompanying text (discussing decisions limiting the sweep of this otherwise plain
language).
33. Proposition 8 included changes in the guidelines for setting bail. See Text of Proposed
Law, in CAL. BALLoT PAMPHLET, supra note 6, at 33 (setting forth proposed CAL. CONST. art. 1, §
28(e)). Under its language, public safety must be given primary consideration. Id A judge could not
release a person charged with a "serious felony" on his or her own recognizance. X 4 However, these
provisions never became "'law.'" Proposition 4 was on the same ballot and passed by a greater
margin; its handling of bail superseded these Proposition 8 provisions. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32
Cal. 3d 236, 254-55, 651 P.2d 274, 285, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30,41 (1982) (finding that the bail provision
was inoperative because Proposition 4 received more votes).
34. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(a) (enacted by Proposition 8). However, diminished capacity
can still be considered by the judge when sentencing. Id at § 25(c). See infra notes 126-135 and
accompanying text (discussing these changes).
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b) (enacted by Proposition 8).
36. Id § 667 (enacted by Proposition 8). See id § 1192.7(c) (enacted by Proposition 8)
(defining 'serious felony").
37. See idL § 1191.1 (enacted by Proposition 8) (providing victims of crime or their next of
kin the right to appear at sentencing proceedings and "reasonably express his or her views
concerning the crime, the person responsible, and the need for restitution"); CAL. WELX. & INST.
CODE § 1767 (enacted by Proposition 8) (providing similar rights to victims of crime or next of kin
in juvenile sentencing proceedings). These remarks of the victim must be expressly noted by the
deciding authority who must then state his or her conclusion as to whether the convicted person will
pose a threat to public safety if released. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (enacted by Proposition 8);
CAL. WELF & INST. CODE § 1767 (enacted by Proposition 8).
980
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with justice" is prohibited when a "serious felony" or driving
under the influence of alcohol or drugs is charged, unless
insufficient evidence exists to convict or no real difference in
sentence will follow. 8 One wonders when these excepted
circumstances can exist or make a difference in an ethically correct
criminal justice system.
Finally, Proposition 8 amended the Welfare and Institutions
Code to mandate that judges cannot sentence to the Youth
Authority persons who are 18 or older when they are convicted of
a "serious felony."
39
I1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHANGES
The practical significance of the additions to the State's
constitution and statutes is scattered. Most of the provisions have
not changed the picture in any noticeable way. A few have affected
procedures to some extent--several of these will be discussed here.
The first three provisions that will be discussed, i.e., restitution,
safe schools, and victim statements, deal with true victims' rights.
The rest are concerned with changes that affect those suspected,
charged, or convicted of crime.
38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (enacted by Proposition 8). See i. § 1192.7(c) (defting
serious felonies)
39. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1732.5 (enacted by Proposition 8). It should be noted that
a section on Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders was also added to the Welfare and Institutions Code
but no real change in law is apparent See i. § 6331 (enacted by Proposition 8). Another important
point is that the Proposition specifically requires a two-thirds majority of the legislature to change
any of these additions to the statutes of California. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 25(d), 667(e), 1191.1,
3043 (enacted by Proposition 8); CAL. WEL . & INST. CODE §§ 6331, 1767 (enacted by Proposition
8).
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A. Restitution
Criminal offenders are subject to civil liability for harms
committed to victims, but few offenders ate able to pay.4"
Additionally, there are times when victims have what most would
consider valid tort claims against public employees or agencies.41
Unfortunately, tort actions against such arms of the government
may be worthless because recovery may be denied on immunity
grounds.42 Some victims' rights proponents seem opposed to suchimmunity barriers; isn't there a right not to be a victim?43
Although most of us will be a victim of crime before we depart
this world, limited governmental immunity seems justified."
However, such governmental tort immunity does not preclude
40. Even though an offender has liability insurance, the insurer will not have to pay if the
harm inflicted by the offender was "expected or intended." See Fire Insurance Exchange v. Abbott,
204 Cal. App. 3d 1012,1022-24,1028-29,251 Cal. Rptr. 620,626-27,630-31 (1988) (providing that
there was no coverage for harm resulting from defendant's sexual contacts with minors despite
psychiatric evidence that the defendants did not intend to injure their victims). See also CAL INs.
CODE § 533 (West 1972) (statutory bar to coverage for harm expected or intended).
Some states, such as New York, enacted laws designed to make wrongdoers disgorge to victims
any proceeds from the wrongdoer's -speech" about the crime. See N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 632-2
(McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992). See also Hudson, The Crime Victim and the Criminal Justice
System: Time For Change, 11 PEPPERDINE L. RnV. 23, 47 (listing 17 other states that, as of 1984,
had enacted similar provisions). However, New York's law was held to violate the First Amendment
because it was a content-based, financial disincentive on speech that was not justified by the state's
interest in compensating victims. Simon & Schuster Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 508 (1991). There may be statutes in other states that are within the
guidelines set by this unanimous opinion.
41. Although the right to civil recovery exists, how far can it go? The old notion that "the
King can do no wrong," no longer exists, but limits must be placed on the civil liability of
governments and public employees. The identification of the limits of such immunity is not easy.
42. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), is often raised in such discussions. In
Martinez, the parole agency released an individual with a history of sex offenses; he killed a fifteen
year old girl shortly after being released. Martinez, 444 U.S. at 279. Should the agency be held
legally liable for this "error in judgment?" The answer was "No." l at 282-83.
43. See Aynes, Constitutional Considerations: Government Responsibility and the Right Not
to be a Victim, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 63 (1984).
44. See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988) (providing a helpful discussion of
this problem for the uninitiated).
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recovery of restitution from either the state or the offender, or
both.45
It was in 1965 that California enacted the first statute providing
state compensation for innocent victims of crime.46 Proposition 8
has added teeth to these rights by amending the California
Constitution to require restitution be provided to all persons
suffering losses as a result of criminal activity.47
As of 1986, the California Penal Code specifically provides that
every victim be provided with information concerning their right
to civil recovery and the opportunity to be compensated from the
Restitution Fund.48 Under California Penal Code section 679,
victims of crime are to be honored and protected "in a manner no
less vigorous than the protections afforded criminal defendants." 9
Additionally, restitution is now a condition of probation in every
case where a person is convicted of a crime and is granted
45. Do not overlook the duty of the probation officer to include in the report to the trial judge
the officer's determination of whether the defendant is a person who is required to pay a fine under
section 13967 of the Government Code, and whether the court should require as a condition of
probation restitution to the victim (or to the Indemnity Fund if assistance has been granted). See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1203 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992).
46. See 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 1549, sees. 1-2, at 3641-42 (enacting CAL. WELY. & INsT. CODE
§§ 1500.02, 11211). The current victim compensation system is codified at California Government
Code sections 13959 through 13969.2. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13959-13969.2 (West 1980 & Supp.
1992). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 679 (setting forth a listing of statutory rights of victims and
witnesses of crimes and requiring that victims and witnesses be advised of their rights to civil
recovery and the opportunity to be compensated from the Restitution Fund created and administered
under the Government Code). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 10601 (West 1991) (creating a federal crime
victims' restitution fund); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1501, 1512-15, 3579-80 (West 1984 & Supp. 1991) (the
federal Omnibus Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, which establishes specified rights for
victims and witnesses). Many other states now have such laws. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.27
(McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1992); ARiuz REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-603c (1989).
47. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f) (enacted by Proposition 8).
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.02(a)(8) (West Supp. 1992). Section 679.02 was enacted in 1986
as part of Title 17 of the California Penal Code, entitled Rights of Victims and Witnesses of Crime.
1986 Cal. Stat. ch. 1427, sec. 1, at 5119 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 679, 679.01, 679.02). See
supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations that exist on the victim's right
to tort recovery). See also CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13959-13969.2 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992)
(providing for the establishment and maintenance of the Restitution Fund).
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 679 (West 1988).
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probation.5" These explicit orders to law enforcement agencies,
prosecutors, and judges to pay closer attention to the civil, moral
and restitutionary rights of victims reflect Proposition 8's
amendments to the California Constitution requiring restitution5'
and declaring a "grave statewide concern" for the rights of victims
of crine.52
B. Safe Schools
Thanks to Proposition 8, the California Constitution now reads:
"All students and staff of public primary, elementary, junior high
and senior high schools have the inalienable right to attend
campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful.", 53 This so-called
"safe schools" provision of Proposition 8 has had little practical
effect. While the provision sounds great and probably had a
powerful impact on those voting in 1982, it accomplished nothing.
In one case interpreting the provision, a student filed suit
claiming a public school teacher abused, beat, and publicly
humiliated him in violation of this duty. 4 The trial judge
sustained the demurrer filed by the defendants (the teacher, school
district, board of education, and the school).55 The First District
Court of Appeal of California affirmed, holding that section 28(c)
does not provide an independent basis for a private right of action
50. Id. § 1203.04(a) (West Supp. 1992). Section 1203.04 was enacted in 1983. 1983 Cal.
Stats. ch. 568, sec. 2, at 2434.
51. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(b) (enacted by Proposition 8).
52. See CAL. Co NsT. art. I, § 28(a) (enacted by Proposition 8).
53. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(c) (enacted by Proposition 8).
54. Clausing v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 221 Cal. App. 3d 1224, 1230, 1235-36,
271 Cal. Rptr. 72,73,77 (1990), review denied, 1990 Cal. LEXIS 4382 (LEXIS, Cal. library, Cases
file) (1990).
55. Id. at 1235, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
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for damages.56 This is not an unusual result.57 It takes more than
a constitutional provision to create a cause of action in tort."
One may ask why the proponents of Proposition 8 did not
specifically create a tort cause of action for victim's of school
violence. It may be that they thought they had done so; what
isambiguous about an "inalienable right?" After all, for every right
there is a remedy.59
It is more likely the proponents of Proposition 8 recognized the
dangers that would accompany such an effort. Not only would such
an effort press the proposition closer to the barrier created by the
single subject doctrine,' it might also have strengthened the
opposition's position by providing them with support from the
56. ld. at 1237,271 Cal. Rptr. at 79. According to the court in Clausing, section 28(c) is not
self-executing in the sense of supplying a right to sue for damages. Id It declares a general right
without specifying any rules for its enforcement, imposes no express duty on anyone to make schools
safe, and is devoid of procedures from which a damages remedy could be inferred. Id at 1237-38,
271 Cal. Rplr. at 79. See Leger v. Stockton Unified School District, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1448,249 Cal.
Rptr. 688 (1988) (Third District Court of Appeal of California decision reaching the same conclusion
as Clausing).
57. See, e.g., Arroyo v. Pla, 748 F. Supp. 56, 60 (1990) (which was guided by DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) in reaching the holding that
there is no private cause of action under the United States Constitution for failure to provide adequate
security or medical attention).
58. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (dismissing a damages action based on an unlawful search and seizure by Federal narcotics
agents); Bumette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588 P.2d 1105 (1978) (holding that a child did not have a
cause of action against parents despite the existence of statutes providing that children must receive
proper nurturing, support, and physical care).
59. This answer is unlikely. Anyone close to law (e.g. legislators, public administrators, etc.)
knows that tort liability is not created by such general language. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Bumette v. Wahl, 284 Or. 705, 588
P.2d 1105 (1978). See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (setting forth several factors relevant to
determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute that does not expressly provide for one).
But see Comment, The Right to Safe Schools: A Newly Recognized Inalienable Right, 14 PAc. LJ.
1309, 1319-32 (1983) (discussing California Constitution article 1, section 28(c) and interpreting the
section as self-executing and as providing a cause of action for damages for violation of a
constitutional right).
60. See CAL. CONST. art. , § 8(d) (requiring that an initiative measure may only embrace one
subject). Even the majority in Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30,
might have found the contents of such a package no longer "reasonably germane." See id. at 247,
651 P.2d at 280, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 36 (1982) (Supreme Court of California held that all the issues
contained in Proposition 8 were "reasonably germane" to the concern for crime victims).
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insurance industry. Regardless of the real reason, the creation of
such a cause of action should not be left to a majority of voters. So
many issues must be carefully considered when adopting or
rejecting a change in the tort liability of a person or entity, let
alone of public institutions such as schools.6' This work is best
left to the courts and legislatures of this country.
C. Victim's Statements
Because of Proposition 8, it is now a given that victims of
crime are to be treated with dignity and respect by law enforcement
agencies, prosecutors, and judges.62 Furthermore, victims must be
notified of court proceedings and must be given the opportunity to
speak at sentencing proceedings and juvenile hearings.63 In
addition, victims are to be informed about their right to civil
recovery and their opportunity to be compensated from the
Restitution Fund.' Finally, victims are to be notified when the
defendant is to be placed on parole.65 In other words, victims are
no longer the forgotten people in criminal proceedings. This is
good.
.Of particular interest to many is Proposition 8's grant to victims
of the right to attend sentencing proceedings and express his or her
views concerning the crime, the person responsible, and the
victim's need for restitution.' The sentencing judge must consider
such statements when imposing a sentence and must state on the
61. See L. GREEN, TF LmATION PRocEss IN ToRT LAW (2d ed. 1977); W. PRoSSER & P.
KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTs § 53, at 356 (5th ed. 1984) (for review on the factors that
enter into decisions on this so-called -duty question").
62. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 679 (West 1988). While not enacted by Proposition 8, this and
similar provisions of the California Penal Code ensuring victims' rights most likely would not have
been enacted without Proposition 8's addition of section 28(a) to the California Constitution.
63. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 679.02(a)(1), (3)-(4) (West Supp. 1992); iL § 1191.1 (enacted by
Proposition 8).
64. CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.02(a)(8) (West Supp. 1992); id. § 1191.2 (West Supp. 1992);
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 13959-13969.2 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992).
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 679.02(a)(11) (West Supp. 1992).
66. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (enacted by Proposition 8).
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record whether the defendant would pose a threat to public safety
if granted probation.67
One special circumstance must be mentioned. The propriety of
victim statements making an issue of a murder victim's high
community standing or of the bereavement of the victim's family
has been considered by the Supreme Court of the United States
several times in recent years.6 8 When such victim statements are
admitted, it can be argued that the defense, when the shoe fits,
could disparage the victim. Surely this shouldn't be allowed. Many
believe that when a jury is asked to choose between death or life
imprisonment for a convicted murderer, their decision must turn on
the defendant's character, not the happenstance of whether the
victim was a vagrant or a pillar of the community.69
Faced with this issue, the Supreme Court of the United States,
in two recent decisions, barred victim impact statements from jury
consideration in capital cases.70  However, this seemingly
established rule was reversed as being ill-considered in Payne v.
Tennessee.7'
In Payne, Chief Justice Rehnquist mustered a majority of the
court who chose not to compound what it considered error; it
overturned its own recent precedents.72 It is now the rule that the
eighth amendment erects no per se barrier prohibiting a capital
sentencing jury from considering "victim impact" evidence
relating to the victim's personal characteristics and the emotional
impact of the murder on the victim's family, or precluding a
67. Id See also id § 1191.15 (West Supp. 1992) (providing that, when necessary, a victim's
statement may be written, audiotaped, or videotaped).
68. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1986), overruled, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991); South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
69. See The Court Sets a Death Agenda, N. Y. Ti1mes, April 27, 1991, § 1, at 24, col. I
(expressing this opinion editorially).
70. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 509; Gathers, 490 U.S. at 809-10 (holding that evidence and
argument relating to the victim and the impact of the victim's death on the victim's family was per
se inadmissible at a capital sentencing hearing). Justices Powell and Brennan, respectively, were the
authors of the now discarded majority opinions.
71. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
72. Id at 2608.
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prosecutor from arguing such evidence at a capital sentencing
hearing.7 3 Apparently the extent of harm caused by the defendant
is a relevant factor in determining the appropriate punishment.74
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented. Justice
Marshall, with whom Justice Blackmun joined, was concerned
about such a sudden change in law by the Supreme Court." They
pointed out that it was only four years earlier in Booth v. Maryland
that a five-Justice majority held that "victim impact" evidence
could not constitutionally be introduced during the penalty phase
of a capital trial, and just two terms ago an effort to rebuff Booth
was denied.76 These dissenters fear that this reaction by the
present majority reflects a feeling that the Court is free to discard
any principle of constitutional liberty just because it has the power
to do so.Y
In his dissent, Justice Stevens points out that, until Payne,
capital punishment jurisprudence required that any decision to
impose the death penalty be based solely on evidence that tends to
inform the jury about the character of the offense and the character
of the defendant.78 Whether the victim was moral or immoral was
irrelevant and inadmissible.79
A local and recent illustration of how "victim impact"
statements may produce problems is provided by People v.
Edwards.80 In Edwards, it was held that evidence of the impact
of the crime (murder and attempted murder) on the surviving
victim and the victim's family is a "circumstance of the crime"
73. Id. at 2608-09.
74. See People v. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787,832-36,819 P.2d 436,464-67 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696,
727-27 (1991) (setting forth California's reaction to this issue). See infra notes 80-85 and
accompanying text (discussing People v. Edwards).
75. Payne, III S. Ct. at 2619 (Marshall, I., dissenting).
76. Id. (Marshall, ., dissenting). See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1986); South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
77. Id. (Marshall J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 2625-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. 54 Cal. 3d 787, 819 P.2d 436, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (1991).
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which is admissible as an aggravating factor at the penalty phase
of a capital case.8" Justice Mosk, dissenting on this point,
questioned the use of "victim impact" evidence in the death
penalty phase of this and similar cases.82 The death penalty
proceeding should be based upon the "circumstances of the
crime." ' 83 The "circumstances" include the manner in which the
actus reus was performed and the motive that underlay the mens
rea.84 Assuming the drafters of California's 1978 death penalty
law desired its constitutionality, and because victim impact
evidence had not, in 1978, received acceptance as a penalty factor,
the effect of the crime on the victim's family was not relevant to
any material circumstance and was therefore unconstitutional.85
Letting victims express themselves may be beneficial to their
mental health but adds little to the judge's basis for sentencing.
Judges know that victims suffer and that stiffer sentences often
help some victims "feel better" about the system. But what are the
judge's proper concerns at this stage of the case? Sympathy is not
an issue. How is the victim's loss relevant to sentencing? The
question of proper restitution is treated separately.
The right to speak has a therapeutic value in many cases. If the
victim is allowed to speak only for therapeutic reasons, aren't we
81. Id at 835, 819 P.2d 467, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 727. With this view, we should compare
People v. Gordon, 50 Cal. 3d 1223, 792 P.2d 251,270 Cal. Rptr. 451 (1990), where the court wrote:
"In the general case-and certainly here-the effect of the crime on the victim's family is not relevant
to any material circumstance. Nor is sympathy for the victim. Obviously, evidence on these matters
is inadmissible." Id. at 1266-67, 792 P.2d at 277-78, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78. Gordon was decided
under the Booth and Gathers rule. Id. at 1268, 792 P.2d at 278, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 478.
82. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 851, 819 P.2d at 477,1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
83. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988).
84. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d at 853, 819 P.2d at 478-79, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 738-39 (Mesk, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
85. See id at 855, 819 P.2d at 479-80, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 739-40 (Mok, J., concurring and
dissenting). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988) (death penalty statute enacted by
initiative in 1978).
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reverting to the old "eye for an eye" level of justice? 6
Restitution is properly provided, but retribution or revenge is out.
It can only be hoped that the use of such material will be
carefully guarded by trial judges. Victims can assist judges at the
sentencing stage but this help must be fairly confined. Lawyers and
judges must rein in efforts by victims to get revenge; victims'
rights and justice must go hand-in-hand.
D. Truth In Evidence
One of the main goals of the proponents of Proposition 8 seems
to have been the correction of what proponents perceived to be the
injustice of the California Evidence Code as construed by the
courts of this state. The so-called "Truth-in-Evidence" provision
is the result. Its language is simple:
[R]elevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding,
including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any
trial or hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in
juvenile or adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing
statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence
Code, Sections 352, 782, or 1103.87
First of all, the truth (in a factual sense) is seldom known.
What we have is evidence of the truth. Most of this evidence is
testimonial. By its nature, testimonial proof is of questionable
value. Without reviewing your courses in evidence, just recall the
four soft spots of testimonial proof; perception, memory, language,
86. See Dahmer Gets 15 Life Terms, San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 15, 1992, Al, col. 2
(setting forth a vivid portrayal of Rita Isbell, the sister of victim Errol Lindsey, screaming obscenities
at serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer). See also Serial Killer Apologizes To Families, id at col. 4 (story
accompanying picture) (describing how Isbell, shaking her fists and shouting obscenities at Dahmer,
had to be physically removed from the courtroom). Nine relatives of Dahmer's victims described for
the court the pain they suffered due to Dahmer's killing, butchering and having sex with the corpses
of their family members. Ld.
87. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(d) (enacted by Proposition 8).
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and sincerity. For instance, suppose A claims there was a bear in
his backyard on Christmas Day; does his saying so make to true?
What of Anita Hill and Judge (now Justice) Thomas; do we know
the truth? One special species of testimonial proof is especially
suspect; what we call "hearsay" is too unreliable for use by jurors,
except when uttered under special circumstances."
Even so-called "real evidence" has its probative problems. The
problems of authenticity and original integrity come immediately
to mind. Suppose our friend "A" produced a plaster cast of a
bear's paw print found in his backyard? Does this convince you A
was telling the truth? The rules of evidence recognize such
problems of reliability." When you add our reliance on lay jurors
to find the truth in both civil and criminal cases, the need for
experience-based rules of evidence becomes apparent.9"
The rules of evidence have, from the beginning, served to assist
jurors in their search for the truth. Only proof that may mislead
jurors, or evidence that must be excluded for policy reasons is kept
from the eyes and ears of lay jurors by today's rules. Existing rules
recognize that some proof is too "hot" for lay persons. For
example, we severely limit the admissibility of character evidence
and prior convictions. Under Proposition 8, most of the problems
associated with these types of evidence are now left to California
Evidence Code section 352.91
88. See CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 1200-1205 (West 1966) (general provisions of California's
hearsay rules); FED. RULE EviD. 801-806 (federal hearsay rules).
89. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1400-1454 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992) (California authentication
provisions); iaL §§ 1500-1511 (West 1966 & Supp. 1992) (California's best evidence rule). See also
FED. RULE EviD. 901-903 (federal authentication provisions); id. 1001-1008 (federal best evidence
rules).
90. Even though England has abolished the use of juries in all but a few civil cases, they do
rely on them in criminal cases. Therefore, some exclusionary rules still exist in England.
91. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 352 (West 1966) (allowing the court discretion to exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will
unduly waste time or create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, confusion or misguidance of the
jury). Under the terms of Proposition 8, existing California privileges and hearsay statutes remain
intact. CAL. CONST. art. , § 28(d) (enacted by Proposition 8). See also FED. R. Evro. 403 (the federal
equivalent to California Evidence Code section 352).
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The proposition simply requires that "relevant evidence" not
be excluded. By definition, "relevant evidence" includes evidence
relating to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, and
evidence having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any
disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action.' On its face, this drops the barrier to character evidence,
proof of prior acts and other prejudicial matters. Fortunately,
section 352 of the California Evidence Code is still with us.9' It
provides: "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that
its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b)
create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury."94
These relevancy rules, together with the retained sections
governing privileges and hearsay, are all a well-trained trial judge
needs to handle a criminal case. However, such a "one-armed" set
of rules for criminal trials leaves much to be desired. Section 352
leaves questions of admissibility to the discretion of the trial judge.
Without more precise guidance, it is possible for one judge to
admit evidence that another would reject.
The more precise rules, set forth in the California Evidence
Code, describing the use of character evidence were carefully
developed over a period of many years. Experience established
their value in our jury-dependent adversary system. Any proposed
change in these rules should be studied carefully; modification is
not something to be left to a majority vote of the general public. 95
92. CAl.. EvID. CODE § 210 (West 1966).
93. See CAL. CONST. art. I, sec. 28(d) (enacted by Proposition 8) ("Nothing in this section
shall affect.. .Evidence Code, Sections 352...").
94. CAi. EviD. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
95. The codification of the rules of evidence is now widespread. But even the most recent
codifications are altered from time to time. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 609 (dealing with the
admissibility of convictions on the issue of credibility). A rather thorough revision of this rule went
into effect a few months ago. See FED. RULE EvlD. 609 Historical and Statutory Notes. Rape shield
laws and tender years exceptions to the hearsay rule are other examples. See CAL Evw. CODE §
1103(c)(1) (West Supp. 1992) (California's rape shield law making opinion evidence, reputation
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Trial judges operating under the "Truth-in-Evidence" system are
left with little real guidance; they are starting over.96
E. Prior Convictions
At common law, convicted felons were incompetent witnesses;
they could not testify under oath at any trial.97 In 1917, the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that "the dead hand of
the common law rule" of disqualification should no longer apply
in federal courts.98 The rule has disappeared from all courts today.
Even so, most courts admit evidence regarding a witness' prior
conviction of certain felonies as relevant to the issue of credibility
in both civil and criminal cases.99 In California, under People v.
evidence orspecific instances of the complaining witness' sexual conduct (except sexual conduct with
the defendant) inadmissible to prove consent); i. § 782 (West Supp. 1992) (governing the procedure
for admission of evidence of sexual conduct of complaining witness); i. § 1228(a) (West Supp.
1992) (California's "tender years" exception providing that a statement by a minor child under 12
describing sexual abuse to that child is not made inadmissable by the hearsay rule); FED. RULE EVID.
412 (federal rape shield law). Again, regardless of your view as to their desirability, each rule was
worked out deliberately by qualified persons.
96. I have not mentioned sections 782 and 1103 of the California Evidence Code; they were
retained by California Constitution article 1, section 28(d). CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d) (enacted by
Proposition 8). These rules (governing the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct of the
victim as impeachment or to prove consent) are but particular statements of the result a well-trained
trial judge could reach using just California Evidence Code sections 210 (defining relevant evidence)
and 352 (giving the court discretion to exclude evidence). Try it yourself.
97. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 519- 520, at 725-30 (Chadbourn Rev. ed. 1979).
98. Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918).
99. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 788 (West 1966); FED. RULE EvID. 609.
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Beagle"0 0  and its progeny,"' a carefully limited rule
developed."°
Under the guise of victims' rights, the proponents of
Proposition 8 attempted to wipe out all barriers to the admission of
evidence of felonies when such evidence was offered for
impeachment purposes. °3 This change, governing the admission
of convictions for impeachment purposes, could have caused the
most significant step to the rear traceable to Proposition 8. Look at
the language: California's Constitution now states that any prior
100. 6 Cal. 3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972).
101. See People v. Barrick, 33 Cal. 3d 115, 122-30, 654 P.2d 1243, 1250-52, 187 Cal. Rptr.
716, 719-26 (1982) (stating that it is error for trial judge to sanitize the auto theft prior conviction
in an auto theft case because it allowed the jury to speculate regarding the nature of the prior
offense); People v. Spearman, 25 Cal. 3d 107, 113-19, 599 P.2d 74, 76-80, 157 Cal. Rptr. 883, 885-
90 (1979) (finding that it was an abuse of discretion to introduce a possession of narcotics prior
conviction in a narcotics case because possession of narcotics did not involve dishonesty); People v.
Fries, 24 Cal. 3d 222, 226-34, 594 P.2d 19, 22-27, 155 Cal. Rptr. 194, 197-202 (1979) (admission
of prior conviction for robbery was error in a current robbery case were no dissimilar prior
convictions were available); People v. Woodward, 23 Cal. 3d 329, 334-42, 590 P.2d 391, 393-99,
152 Cal. Rptr. 536, 538-44 (1979) (error for trial court to fail to exercise discretion to exclude
evidence of prior convictions for voluntary manslaughter and ex-felon with a gun because these
convictions ostensibly had no bearing on truthfulness); People v. Rollo, 20 Cal. 3d 109, 115-23, 569
P.2d 771, 773-77, 141 CaL Rptr. 177, 179-84 (1977) (error to admit only fact of the prior conviction,
leaving the defense with an option to disclose nature of the prior conviction); People v. Rist, 16 Cal.
3d 211, 218-23, 545 P.2d 833, 838-41, 127 Cal. Rptr. 457, 462-65 (1976) (trial court abused its
discretion by introducing a prior conviction for robbery in a current robbery case where dissimilar
prior convictions were also available); People v. Antick, 15 Cal. 3d 79, 96-100, 539 P.2d 243, 254-
56, 123 Cal. Rptr. 475, 486-88 (1975) (introduction of a prior conviction required reversal because
prior conviction was remote in time). See also People v. Harrison, 150 Cal. App. 3d 1142, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 762 (1984) (this line of cases abrogated by Proposition 8).
102. In Beagle, the California Supreme Court held that a trial judge must exercise discretion
to prevent impeachment of a witness by evidence of a prior felony conviction when the probative
value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d
at 447, 492 P.2d at 4,99 Cal. Rptr. at 316. The Beagle court gave further guidance to the trial courts
by setting forth important factors that trial courts must consider in determining the admissability of
prior convictions. Id at 453-54, 492 P.2d at 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 320. Following these guidelines, trial
courts developed a line of decisions excluding evidence of prior convictions that were too remote in
time, too similar to the offense charged, or that were convictions for acts of violence, since violent
or assaultive crimes generally do not bear on the honesty or veracity of the actor. See supra note 101
(setting forth the decisions following the Beagle guidelines).
103. CAI- CONST. art. I, § 28(f) (enacted by Proposition 8).
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felony conviction can be used for impeachment purposes in any
criminal proceeding.1'
Even though the electorate believed evidence of convictions
should be freely admitted on the credibility issue, a majority of the
Supreme Court of California feared such a bold and simple
approach would violate due process rights."05 Under the court's
interpretation in People v. Castro,'°6 a majority of the Supreme
Court of California held that the strident language of section 28(t)
could not be taken literally; only a conviction for a crime involving
"moral turpitude" may be considered on the issue of
credibility.1 7 Of such convictions, only those that meet the
balancing tests of section 352 of the California Evidence Code are
admissible."'8
104. ld. Section 28(f) provides:
Any priorfelony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding, whether adult or
juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or
enhancement of sentence in any criminalproceeding. When a prior felony conviction is
an element of any felony offense, it shall be proven to the trier of fact in open court.
IA (emphasis added). California lawyers readily recognized this as an about-face from People v.
Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441,492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972). Of course, Beagle and its progeny (the
so-called "Antick line of cases") were among the biggest problems with our criminal justice system
in the eyes of the supporters of Proposition 8. See Curb, Arguments in Favor of Proposition 8, in
CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLE, supra note 6, at 34. See also supra note 101 (setting forth the Anick line
of cases).
105. But see People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301,321,696 P.2d 111, 124,211 Cal. Rptr. 719,732
(1985) (Grodin, J., concurring and dissenting). Citing to Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967),
Justice Grodin admits that the due process issue is not without strength. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d at 321,
696 P.2d at 124, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 732. However, Justice Grodin believes it would fail. Ia He
discusses several decisions from the District of Columbia for support Ld. The interest in getting
evidence bearing upon the credibility of witnesses before the jury in a criminal case may outweigh
its inescapably prejudicial effect. l
106. 38 Cal. 3d 301,696 P.2d 111, 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1985). The defendant in Castro was
convicted of receiving stolen property. At at 305, 696 P.2d at 112, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 720. She was
impeached with what proved to be prior convictions of possession ofheroin and possession of heroin
for sale. Id at 305-06, 696 P.2d at 112-13, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 720-21. It was held that simple
possession did not necessarily involve "'moral turpitude," but that possession for sale did. ML at 317,
696 P.2d at 121, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 729. "Possession for sale" can reasonably be characterized as
"immoral." ML
107. Md at 309-17, 696 P.2d at 115-20, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 723-28.
108. L at 317, 696 P.2d at 120, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
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How this variation of seemingly plain language was created is
interesting. On the one hand, Justice Grodin could not imagine how
a person wishing to admit any felony conviction on the issue of
credibility could have worded the subdivision more clearly. 9 On
the other hand, Justice Kaus, joined in his successful search for
ambiguity by Justices Mosk, Broussard, and Bird, concluded that
the electorate did not intend to abrogate entirely the discretion of
the trial judge under section 352,110 which Kaus characterized as
"a traditional, inherent and, in truth, indispensable tool of the law
of evidence. ' u. Kaus reasoned that since section 28 contained
two subdivisions, the subdivisions must be reconciled.1 2 Each
must be subject to the section 352 balancing test.113 However,
Justice Lucas (now Chief Justice) and Justice Grodin agreed that
the language of subsection (f) was clear and therefore any felony
conviction is admissible on the question of a witness's credibility
in a criminal proceeding.'
It can be argued that convictions should never be used to
impeach a witness. Such proof of the witness's past has little
probative value on his or her credibility while testifying in the
109. See a,4 at 319, 696 P.2d at 122, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (Grodin, J., concurring and
dissenting).
110. Id at 306-14, 696 P.2d at 113-18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 721-26.
111. Id at 309, 696 P.2d at 115, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
112. Id at 309-14, 696 P.2d at 115-18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 723-26.
113. Id. at 312-13, 696 P.2d at 117-18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 725. The Justices did not agree on
how this was to be exercised. It was Justice Kaus' view that only convictions evidencing a
"'readiness to do evil" (i.e. moral turpitude) should be considered. Id at 314-16, 696 P.2d at 119-20,
211 Cal. Rptr. at 726-28. To take into account any and all convictions could raise serious due process
questions. Id at 317, 696 P.2d at 120-21, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 728. Justices Mosk, Broussard, and
Grodin agreed on the moral turpitude threshold. Id at 317, 322, 696 P.2d at 120-21, 124, 211 Cal.
Rptr. at 728, 732 (Grodin, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Lucas would admit all felony
convictions. Id at 322-23, 696 P.2d at 124-25, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 732-33 (Lucas, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Bird would simply apply the factors set forth in Beagle to any conviction. Id at
323-32, 696 P.2d at 125-32, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 733-40 (Bird, CJ., concurring and dissenting). In then-
Chief Justice Bird's view, the majority view not only lacked clarity but was an open-ended invitation
to judicial chaos. Id at 336, 696 P.2d at 134, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 742 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
114. Id at 319,696 P.2d at 122,211 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (Grodin, J., concurring and dissenting);
id. at 322-23, 696 P.2d at 124-25, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 732-33 (Lucas, J., concurring and dissenting).
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presence of a jury. "' Under rules remaining after passage of
Proposition 8, the admission of evidence of convictions is treated
much more liberally than evidence of other specific instances of
conduct" 6 or proof of character." 7 However, the fact that a
person has been convicted of a felony is no more relevant in a
logical sense than proof of other instances of specific conduct or
proof of a person's character; it is simply easier to show. None
should be shown.
Under Castro, assuming due process prohibits conviction on the
basis of the consideration of irrelevant evidence, a witness may not
be impeached with a prior felony conviction unless that conviction
is relevant to the witness's veracity.1 8 According to Castro, the
question should be whether it can be said with substantial
assurance that the credibility of a witness is adversely affected by
his having suffered this conviction." 9 To answer this question,
the majority in Castro instructed us to limit ourselves to
convictions showing a general readiness to do evil--crimes
involving "moral turpitude."2 ' Using this test, one appellate
court approved the use of a conviction based on violation of
California Penal Code section 422; 121 the defendant had
threatened serious harm to another." The defendant's argument
that this conviction had nothing to do with his veracity was
115. Grave doubt about the validity of convictions as tests for the credibility of a testifying
witness has existed for years. See, e.g., Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV.
166, 177-78 (1940). There is little doubt that limiting instructions are not effective. See, e.g., People
v. Montgomery, 268 N.E.2d 695, 697 (11. 1971).
116. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 787 (West 1966) (proof of a specific instance of conduct
is inadmissible to attack or support credibility).
117. See, e.g., CAL. Evwv. CODE § 786 (West 1966) (proof of character traits other than honesty
or veracity, or their opposites, is inadmissible to attack or support the credibility of a witness).
118. People v. Castro, 38 Cal. 3d 301, 315, 696 P.2d 111, 119, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 719, 727
(1985).
119. Id
120. Id. at 316, 696 P.2d at 120, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
121. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 422 (West Supp. 1992) (setting forth the elements of the offense
of "terrorist threats").
122. People v. Thornton, 1992 Cal. App. LXIS 135 (LEXIS, Cal. library, Cases file) (reported
in San Francisco Daily J., D.A.R. at 1759, (Feb. 6, 1992)).
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rejected as unsound.'2 The Fourth District Court of Appeals had
no doubt that making such threats violates accepted standards of
moral behavior and, therefore, the trial judge did not err in
permitting the defendant to be impeached by such a conviction. 24
Once admitted, proof of a prior conviction is devastating. The
fear that prior convictions will be admitted has kept many a
defendant from taking the stand. Who has not heard jurors lament
that they weren't told that the defendant they just freed had "done
it" before?
The best rule would be to exclude proof of prior convictions
altogether in jury trials. Since this view is not acceptable to most,
the recently amended federal rule is probably the best
alternative."z
F. Diminished Capacity and Insanity
Some may find it difficult to fit the change of rules relating to
diminished capacity and insanity in California criminal law under
the heading of "Victims' Rights." These changes to the California
Penal Code, enacted by Proposition 8, affect defenses available to
persons accused of crime, not the rights of a victim of crime.126
123. Id. 1992 Cal. App. LEXIS 135 (reported in San Francisco Daily J., Daily Appellate
Report at 1759, 1760 (Feb. 6, 1992)).
124. I
125. See FED. R. EVID. § 609(a). Rule 609(a) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, (1) evidence that a witness other
than the accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if
the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law
under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted
of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and (2) evidence
that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonest
or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
IcL See generally Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989) (containing an
interesting history of this area of evidence law).
126. See CAL. PENAL oDE § 25 (enacted by Proposition 8).
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The so-called "diminished capacity" defense had its California
origin in People v. Wells. 27 The true nature of the defense is
clear:
[S]ince certain crimes, by definition, require the existence of a specific
intent, any evidence relevant to the existence of that intent, including
evidence of an abnormal mental condition not constituting legal insanity,
is competent for the purpose of [negating] that intent.... [Tihe actual
purpose of such evidence is to establish, by negating the requisite intent
for a higher degree of offense, that in fact a lesser degree of the offense
was committed.
128
Unfortunately, problems marked the development of this
doctrine in California. The Supreme Court of California finally
urged the legislature to reconsider the wisdom of statutes providing
for bifurcated trials, and the diminished capacity and insanity
defenses often used in such trials; there seemed to be serious
duplications of evidence.'29 In partial response, the legislature
abolished diminished capacity as a defense. 3 Shortly thereafter,
127. 33 Cal. 2d 330,202 P.2d 53 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836; overruled, 22 Cal. 3d 318,
583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978). In Wells, a life-term prisoner illed a prison guard. Id at
334, 202 P.2d at 56. This would be a capital offense if done with malice aforethought. Id The
defendant offered psychiatric testimony that he was suffering from an abnormal physical and mental
condition which caused him to fear for his personal safety in response to even slight external stimuli.
Id, at 344, 202 P.2d at 62. His defense was that he was reacting to an honest but unreasonable fear
of bodily harm when he assaulted the guard. Id. at 345, 202 P.2d at 62. The Supreme Court of
California held that the trial court erred in excluding this evidence. Id. at 345, 202 P.2d at 63.
Evidence which tends to show that a (then presumed) legally sane defendant either did or did not in
fact possess the required specific intent or motive is admissible. Id. at 350-51, 202 P.2d at 66.
Mental infirmities or even intoxication may fill this bill. This must be distinguished from the
insanity defense which goes to whether the defendant can be found legally responsible for his actions.
It is only the legally sane defendant that may rely on diminished capacity as a defense to a charged
offense requiring a specific (but unattainable) intent. This was sound law.
128. Annotation, Mental or Emotional Condition as Diminishing Responsibility for Crime, 22
A.LL 3d 1228, 1238 (1968).
129. See People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 331, 583 P.2d 1308, 1317, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265,
274 (1978).
130. See Note, Admissibility of Psychiatric Testimony in the Guilt Phase of Bilfircared Trials:
What's Left After the Reforms of the Diminished Capacity Defense, 16 PAC. LJ. 305 (1984-85)
(providing a full discussion of this issue).
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Proposition 8 followed the same course."' The present state of
diminished capacity in a murder case is described in People v.
Saille,"' a 1991 decision by the Supreme Court of California.
The Saille court reiterated the rule that evidence of mental disease,
disorder, or defect is still admissible on the issue of whether the
accused actually formed an intent unlawfully to kill (i.e. the malice
aforethought question),"' but such proof cannot be used to
reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter. " This is compatible
with People v. Wells 35 and should not adversely affect the rights
of an accused person.
131. CAL. PENAL CODE § 25 (enacted by Proposition 8). Section 25 provides as follows:
(a) The defense of diminished capacity is hereby abolished. In a criminal action, as well
as any juvenile court proceeding, evidence concerning an accused person's intoxication,
trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect shall not be admissible to show or negate
capacity to form the particular purpose, intent, motive, malice aforethought, kmowledge,
or other mental state required for the commission of the crime charged.
(b)...
(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing, evidence of diminished capacity or of a mental disorder
may be considered by the court only at the time of sentencing or other disposition or
commitment.
Id
132. 54 Cal. 3d 1103, 820 P.2d 588, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364 (1991).
133. 1&. at 1115, 820 P.2d at 595,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 372.
134. Id.
In our view, under the law relating to mental capacity as it exists today, it makes more
sense to place on the defendant the duty to request an instruction which relates the
evidence of his intoxication to an element of the crime, such as premeditation and
deliberation. T"his is so because the defendant's evidence of intoxication can no longer be
proffered as a defense to a crime but rather is proffered in an attempt to raise a doubt on
an element of a crime which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. In
such a case the defendant is attempting to relate his evidence of intoxication to an element
of the crime.
Id at 1120, 820 P.2d at 598-99, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 374-75.
135. 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949). See supra note 127 and accompanying text
(discussing the Wells decision).
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G. Plea Bargaining
To many lay persons, the outlawing of plea bargaining in
"serious felonies" automatically moves the criminal justice system
closer to justice; no longer can lawyers make deals that permit
criminals to escape their just desserts.136 Those accused of crime
must stand trial; "negotiated justice" is contrary to public interests.
Since the passage of Proposition 8, plea bargaining is
prohibited137 when the information charges a "serious felony" or
driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs is involved. '38 If
this statute was to be literally applied, the criminal justice system
would grind to a halt. As anyone directly involved in the
prosecution or defense of criminal cases knows, plea bargaining is
still in place and performing its function.139 However, since plea
bargaining is now banned in superior courts, Proposition 8 has
caused a shift to action in the lower courts. 40 Therefore, the
majority of serious felony cases now conclude before preliminary
hearing. This change means more cases are concluded before
victims or witnesses can testify and often before background
checks are completed. The promoters of Proposition 8 wanted to
encourage public participation in the prosecution of such serious
cases; the opposite occurs more frequently.
136. Cohen & Doob, Public Attitude to Plea Bargaining, 32 CRiM. L.Q. 85 (1989-90).
137. Judicial discretion is out; the word "prohibited" is clear. See People v. Superior Court,
140 Cal. App. 3d 304, 316, 189 Cal. Rptr. 669, 677-78 (1983), hearing granted, May 4, 1983, case
discharged, Jan. 19, 1984.
138. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (enacted by Proposition 8).
139. Plea bargaining has its counterpart in the civil justice system. Settlement of civil claims
is a must; only a small percentage of civil disputes can or need be tried. In fact, it can be argued that
settlement of either civil or criminal matters is a fair and efficient way to handle disputes in our
adversary system. The outcome of trials that must be tried furnish the basis for the disposition of the
thousands of cases that are settled.
140. McCoy & Tillman, Controlling Felony Plea Bargaining in California: The Impact of the
"Victim Bill of Rights" 4 (Aug. 1986) (monograph prepared for Criminal Justice Fellowship
Program sponsored by the California Department of Justice) (Copy on file at Pacific Law Journal).
Ms. McCoy studied Alameda, San Diego, and part of Los Angeles County court records. Id. at 19.
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The system works very well so long as prosecutors and defense
lawyers do their jobs in an ethical and professional manner. Any
lapses are subject to detection and correction by trial judges. 141
The advantages of negotiation rather than trial are apparent. Not
only does it save prosecutor resources, but with cooperative
witnesses, concessions will be minimal. By producing swift
convictions, any deterrent value should be enhanced.
Justice can be accomplished efficiently when proper plea
bargaining exists. Again it is fortunate that this portion of
Proposition 8 has had little practical effect on the actions of either
the prosecution or defense of accused persons.142
CONCLUSIONS
Justice Mosk, dissenting in Brosnahan, said it best: "The
Goddess of Justice is wearing a black arm-band today, as she
weeps for the Constitution of California."' 43 Justice Mosk
lamented that a bare majority of the court had just declared that
initiative promoters may now offend with greater ease established
constitutional and code limitations; the requirement that initiative
measures embrace a single subject'" is now impotent. 145
Therefore, promoters feasting on the fleeting whims of public
opinion and prejudice can, by simply selling even the most radical
of proposals to 51 percent of those who vote, change longstanding,
141. Hoffman, Plea Bargaining and the Role of the Judge, 53 F.R.D. 499 (1971); Hobbs,
Judicial Supervision Over California Plea Bargaining: Regulating the Trial, 59 CAL L. REV. 962
(1971).
142. See White, A Proposalfor Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV.
439 (1971).
143. Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 CaL 3d 236, 299, 651 P.2d 274, 313, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 69
(1982) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
144. See CAL CoNsT. art. II, § 8(d) (California's single subject rule).
145. The provisions of Proposition 8 are "germane" to each other and "serve a common
purpose;" this satisfies the constitutional limitation. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d at 253, 651 P.2d at 284,
186 Cal. Rptr. at 40 (1982).
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well considered rules that, to them, seem to impede the
achievement of their special goals.
In the case of Proposition 8, the possibility of great damage to
the criminal justice system has been rather well contained by the
courts. 146 However, Hamilton's warning147 was put in a slightly
different way by Justice Wright:
A democratic government must do more than serve the immediate needs
of a majority of its constituency--it must respect the 'enduring general
values' of the society. Somehow, a democracy must tenaciously cling
to its long-term concepts of justice regardless of the vacillating feelings
experienced by a majority of the electorate. 148
The criminal justice system itself can resolve most of the
problems with more adequate funding. The system can improve its
response time and its treatment of victims and witnesses during the
tedious but necessary investigative procedures. The apprehension
and processing of those suspected of crime must also be improved.
However, it must be remembered that every suggested change is of
consequence not only to those directly affected but also to each
member of society. For example, making it easier to charge a
person or to convict those who have been charged may work out
to be an undesirable solution. 149 What we need is better training
and the more wide-spread presence of law enforcement personnel.
146. However, consider the more devastating consequences of Proposition 115. The final score
is not yet in on this more recent initiative.
147. See supra note 1 and accompanying text
148. Wright, The Role of Judiciary, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1262, 1267 (1972) (quoted by Justice
Mosk in his dissent in Brosnahan). See Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d 236,299,651 P.2d 274,313, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 30, 69 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
149. See supra notes 87-125 and accompanying text (discussing Proposition 8's changes in
rules governing the truth-in-evidence provision and use of convictions). It shouldn't take a privately
owned video camera to convince us that police violence still exists. See Brutality!, TUdM, March 23,
1991, vol. 137, no. 12, at 16-19 (coverage of the Rodney King incident). Why don't we protect
victims of claimed police brutality by lowering the standards governing charging, prosecuting, and
convicting a police officer? What of these victims?
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The adjudicative procedures themselves are dependant on the
help and testimony of victims and witnesses; without them,
prosecution would be impossible."' 0 From the initial report of
crime, through the closing of the case, the victim and witnesses are
entitled to consideration and respect. They don't always get it.
However, simply changing the rules won't solve the problem.
Providing a "right" has no meaning in many hard pressed criminal
justice systems;151 it takes money.
To sum up, some of the more active victim rights proponents
point to the well-articulated rights bestowed on an accused person,
and argue that equally clear rights must be adopted for victims.
These rights for victims properly include remedies for restitution,
civil recovery, and crime victim compensation. 152 To a large
extent, such rights already exist. Efforts to change the rules
governing criminal procedure by initiatives produced and pressed
by special interest groups, however sincere, must be
discouraged. 153 To a large extent Proposition 8 is an excellent
example of such risky endeavors.
150. Notifying victims and witnesses of needed appearances and keeping them fully advised
of the progress and disposition of each case takes time and well-trained personnel. The widespread
failure of the system in this area is one of the chief complaints of both victims and witnesses. See,
e.g., Kelly, Vctims' Perception of Criminal Justice, II PEPPERDwE L. REV. 15, 19 (1984).
151. All agree that an individual's contact with the system should be as painless as possible.
Trial judges are charged with the duty of protecting witnesses from harassment and undue
embarrassment. See CAL EVID. CODE § 765 (West Supp. 1992), FED. R. EVID. 611(a). There is no
doubt as to the need for judicial control in this area. See Bergerv. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84-85
(1935), overruled, 361 U.S. 212 (1960) (transcript of the prosecutor's cross-examination).
152. See Hudson,A Bill of Rightsfor Crime ,ictims, 5 VICTIMoLOY: AN INT'L. J. 428 (1980);
Hudson, The Crime ictim and the Criminal Justice System: Time for a Change, 11 PEPPERDIWE L.
REv. 23, 33 (1984).
153. It is important that we distinguish democracy and liberty. In a "democracy" the people
rule; a majority vote decides disputed matters. But "liberty" refers to the rights and obligations of
each member of a democracy. A simple majority cannot affect individual rights; these rights are
enforced by the courts guided by our constitution.
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